Séance tenante: Deconstruction in (the) place of ethics now by Milesi, Laurent
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/69089/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Milesi, Laurent 2015. Séance tenante: Deconstruction in (the) place of ethics now. Parallax 21 (1) ,
pp. 6-25. 10.1080/13534645.2014.988908 file 
Publishers page: 
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
PROOF COVER SHEET
Author(s): Laurent Milesi
Article title: SE´ANCE TENANTE: Deconstruction in (the) Place of Ethics
Now
Article no: TPAR 988908
Enclosures: 1) Query sheet
2) Article proofs
Dear Author,
1. Please check these proofs carefully. It is the responsibility of the corresponding
author to check these and approve or amend them. A second proof is not normally
provided. Taylor & Francis cannot be held responsible for uncorrected errors, even if
introduced during the production process. Once your corrections have been added to
the article, it will be considered ready for publication.
Please limit changes at this stage to the correction of errors. You should not make
trivial changes, improve prose style, add new material, or delete existing material at
this stage. You may be charged if your corrections are excessive (we would not
expect corrections to exceed 30 changes).
For detailed guidance on how to check your proofs, please paste this address into a
new browser window: http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/production/checkingproofs.asp
Your PDF proof file has been enabled so that you can comment on the proof directly
using Adobe Acrobat. If you wish to do this, please save the file to your hard disk
first. For further information on marking corrections using Acrobat, please paste this
address into a new browser window: http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/production/
acrobat.asp
2. Please review the table of contributors below and confirm that the first and
last names are structured correctly and that the authors are listed in the correct
order of contribution. This check is to ensure that your name will appear correctly
online and when the article is indexed.
Sequence Prefix Given name(s) Surname Suffix
1 Laurent Milesi
Queries are marked in the margins of the proofs, and you can also click the
hyperlinks below.
AUTHOR QUERIES
General points:
1. Permissions: You have warranted that you have secured the necessary
written permission from the appropriate copyright owner for the
reproduction of any text, illustration, or other material in your article.
Please see http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/permissions/
usingThirdPartyMaterial.asp.
2. Third-party content: If there is third-party content in your article, please
check that the rightsholder details for re-use are shown correctly.
3. Affiliation: The corresponding author is responsible for ensuring that
address and email details are correct for all the co-authors. Affiliations
given in the article should be the affiliation at the time the research was
conducted. Please see http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/preparation/
writing.asp.
4. Funding: Was your research for this article funded by a funding agency?
If so, please insert ‘This work was supported by,insert the name of the
funding agency in full. ’, followed by the grant number in square brackets
‘[grant number xxxx]’.
5. Supplemental data and underlying research materials: Do you wish to
include the location of the underlying research materials (e.g. data,
samples or models) for your article? If so, please insert this sentence before
the reference section: ‘The underlying research materials for this article
can be accessed at , full link. / description of location [author to
complete]’. If your article includes supplemental data, the link will also be
provided in this paragraph. See ,http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/
preparation/multimedia.asp. for further explanation of supplemental
data and underlying research materials.
No Author Queries
How to make corrections to your proofs using Adobe Acrobat/Reader
Taylor & Francis offers you a choice of options to help you make corrections to your
proofs.
Your PDF proof file has been enabled so that you can edit the proof directly using
Adobe Acrobat/Reader. This is the simplest and best way for you to ensure that your
corrections will be incorporated. If you wish to do this, please follow these
instructions:
1. Save the file to your hard disk.
2. Check which version of Adobe Acrobat/Reader you have on your computer. You
can do this by clicking on the “Help” tab, and then “About.”
If Adobe Reader is not installed, you can get the latest version free from
http://get.adobe.com/reader/.
3. If you have Adobe Acrobat/Reader 10 or a later version, click on the “Comment”
link at the right-hand side to view the Comments pane.
4. You can then select any text and mark it up for deletion or replacement, or insert
new text as needed. Please note that these will clearly be displayed in the Comments
pane and secondary annotation is not needed to draw attention to your corrections.
If you need to include new sections of text, it is also possible to add a comment to
the proofs. To do this, use the Sticky Note tool in the task bar. Please also see our
FAQs here: http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/production/index.asp.
5. Make sure that you save the file when you close the document before uploading it
to CATS using the “Upload File” button on the online correction form. If you have
more than one file, please zip them together and then upload the zip file.
If you prefer, you can make your corrections using the CATS online correction form.
Troubleshooting
Acrobat help: http://helpx.adobe.com/acrobat.html
Reader help: http://helpx.adobe.com/reader.html
Please note that full user guides for earlier versions of these programs are available
from the Adobe Help pages by clicking on the link “Previous versions” under the
“Help and tutorials” heading from the relevant link above. Commenting functionality
is available from Adobe Reader 8.0 onwards and from Adobe Acrobat 7.0 onwards.
Firefox users: Firefox’s inbuilt PDF Viewer is set to the default; please see the
following for instructions on how to use this and download the PDF to your hard
drive: http://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/view-pdf-files-firefox-without-
downloading-them#w_using-a-pdf-reader-plugin
SE´ANCE TENANTE: Deconstruction in (the) Place of Ethics Now
Laurent Milesi
There is no ethics without the presence of the other but also, and consequently,
without absence, dissimulation, detour, differance, writing. The arche-writing is
the origin of morality as of immorality. The nonethical opening of ethics.
A violent opening.
Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, 139–40.
One of the perceived hallmarks of ‘vintage deconstruction’, ever since Derrida’s trio of
monographs in 1967, has been its questioning of origins and of the plenitude of
presence, andmore recently – since Specters ofMarx grappled with issues of spectrality,
messianicity and virtuality – of the contemporary and the ‘now’.1 Equally prevalent,
until Critchley’s timely corrective and Bernasconi’s earlier work on Derrida’s
indebtedness to Levinas,2 had been the impatience with deconstruction’s alleged
inability to propose an ethics as well as a politics on grounds that it always defers the
criticalmoment of decision-making, whereas both the so-called ethical choice involving
responsibility and political action would be deemed to require for maximum efficiency
an urgency of response in the here and now, forthwith, se´ance tenante.3
I would like to revisit such undisputed givens in the light of an alternative,
Derridean conception of place, space and temporality, and show how these – which,
together with the first-person subject, form the deictics of any act of enunciation and
thus would open onto a reflection on performativity and representation (a word which
has to be made to resonate in both its aesthetic and political dimensions) – can lead
to a more ‘absolute’, ‘archaic’ demarcation and reinvention of the ‘ethical’.
In Of Hospitality, as a basis for his conception of cosmopolitics and unconditional
hospitality, Derrida recalls the Hegelian understanding of ‘ethics’ (Sittlichkeit) as
ethos, as a set of customs characteristic of a place to which it lends its political,
national, ‘eco-nomic’, etc. identity:
the circumscribed field of ethos or ethics, of habitat or time spent as
ethos, of Sittlichkeit, of objective morality, especially in the three
instances determined by law and Hegel’s philosophy of law: the
family, bourgeois or civil society, and the State (or the nation-state) [to
which one could add the city as polis ].4
q 2014 Taylor & Francis
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Thus, for Derrida, the problem of hospitality, as essential to deconstruction as is
justice,5 is
coextensive with the ethical problem. It is always about answering for
a dwelling place, for one’s identity, one’s space, one’s limits, for the
ethos as abode, habitation, house, hearth, family, home.6
The ethical implications of the dwelling place (demeure) in relation to the issue of
justice-to-come as opposed to law-as-justice will be developed later on, when I argue
for what I will call a problematic of the non-lieu in deconstructive ethics. For the
moment, and as a preliminary step, I wish to engage with Derrida’s spatio-temporal
redeployment of the ‘now’ (maintenant) according to quasi-originary diffe´rance, which
he famously defined as at once spacing and tempor(al)ization, ‘the becoming-time of
space and the becoming-space of time’.7
Main-tenance
What could be misconstrued as an inventive French rendering of Benjaminian
Jetztzeit (‘now-time’)8 is first introduced in ‘Signature Event Context’, in the
discussion of the necessity of a more structural, generalizable absence as a pre-
condition of any act of communication, such as a signature:
By definition, a written signature implies the actual or empirical
nonpresence of the signer. But, it will be said, it also marks and retains
his having-been-present in a past now, which will remain a future
now, and therefore in a now in general, in the transcendental form of
nowness (maintenance). This general maintenance is somehow inscribed,
stapled to present punctuality, always evident and always singular, in
the form of the signature.9
Drawing out and reorienting the implications of Husserl’s ‘retention’ and
‘protention’ already analysed in Speech and Phenomena and ‘Diffe´rance’,10 this
‘general maintenance’ emphasizes the dis-location (spacing) of time at work in the
contemporary (temporalizing) – to which Derrida will return in Specters of Marx,
substituting to the speculative ontology of presence a spectral hauntology of the
messianic and the virtual. Before that, this ‘general maintenance’ will resurface at the
crossroads of aesthetics and ethics, in the intervention on architectural space
originally known as ‘Point de folie – Maintenant l’architecture’.
In this essay dedicated to the ‘follies’ of deconstruction-inspired architect Bernard
Tschumi in the Parc de la Villette, Derrida attempts to adumbrate a different socio-
political and ethical conception of habitation, ‘the law of the oikos’ or another economy
(NPM, 90: ‘oikonomy’) of the habitat.11 According to Derrida, Tschumi’s
architectural follies ‘give us to think about what takes place’ (NPM, 95), the event in/of
a place ‘to give a right place to [ fait droit a` ] dissociation, but to put it to work as such in
the space of a gathering’ in order to strive towards a spacing and ‘a socius of dissociation’
(NPM, 100; translation modified). Tschumi’s emphasis on dis- (and trans-) processes,
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noted by Derrida, impacts on the relationship between dis-location and communal
space; it ‘signs a “mad” contract between the socius and dissociation’ (NPM, 101) and
interrupts aHegeliandialectic of spatial geometry first explored in the essay ‘Ousia and
Gramme`’ (Margins of Philosophy), whereby the ‘now’ (maintenant) is merely the
maintained and suppressed (aufgehoben) truth of the point (NPM, 101) – hence the self-
dividing, undialectizable double entendre of point de in ‘point de folie’, pointing at the
‘atopicality’ of a madness without madness:12
A force joins and holds together the dis-jointed as such. It does not
affect the dis- from the outside. The dis-jointed itself, maintaining
architecture, the architecture that arrests madness in its dislocation.
(NPM 100)
Through a differential process of abstraction, distraction and also subtraction – of
architecture from its habitual ends in construction and in ‘the value of habitation’13 –
Derrida’s maintenance points towards an event which breaks with presence,
‘maintaining’ spacing in dissociation, and the relation to the other as such: ‘Non pas
la main tenue mais la main tendue par-dessus l’abıˆme’,14 i.e. not the hand holding the
other here and now – time being the truth of space according to Hegelian dialectic –
holding him or her to a (socially, politically, economically, etc.) pre-ordained place
and position, but the hand held out to the other in dissociation over the abyss that
necessarily separates one from the other.
The complicity between deconstruction and a new sense of gathering, association,
community, maintaining in maintenant was similarly emphasized in the interview
with Peter Brunette and David Wills on spatial arts, soon after Derrida commented
on the seeming paradox of putting forward a ‘deconstructive architecture’ for a
‘discipline’ whose duty and vocation is traditionally to ‘construct’:
[ . . . ] ‘deconstructive architecture’ refers precisely to what happens in
terms of ‘gathering’ [ . . . ], the being together [eˆtre ensemble ], the
assembly, the now [maintenant ], the maintaining. Deconstruction does
not consist simply of dissociating or disarticulating or destroying, but
of affirming a certain ‘being together,’ a certain maintenant [ . . . ].15
Bearing in mind that droit (law, right) is the necessary preamble to justice(-to-come)
in deconstruction (‘Force of Law’), to which we will turn in a final movement, the
phrase ‘faire droit a`’ which I highlighted above can be made to chime with Derrida’s
attempt to redefine and understand anew the maintenant:
Maintenant: if the word still designates what happens [ . . . ], this
imminence of the just ( just happens, just happened, is just about to
happen) no longer lets itself be inscribed in the ordered sequence of a
history [ . . . ]. (NPM, 88)
Maintenant, therefore, can now be parsed and dissociated, spaced out, as main tenant,
tenant par la main, holding hand(s) with (con-) but a company or accompaniment that
parallax
53
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
TPAR 988908—5/1/2015—SATHISHKUMAR.K—500448—Own Style
for Derrida, for justice-to-come and a relation to the other-as-such, is always to be
envisaged as an X without X – such as messianicity without messianism, religion
without religion,16 society without society, the dissociation of the socius or
‘unbinding’ (de´liaison),17 a community without the com-, and therefore open to the
auto-immune as a co-immunity18 – to which we will eventually add the non-lieu in a
last endeavour to formalize the experience of this originary spacing of a place
without place.19 Tenir, and especially se tenir, a verb also used to indicate ethical
deportment, can be heard in this revitalized conception of nowness whereby one
should also, as it were, ‘speak from / know one’s place’ when one takes up a stand,
stance or position, be constantly aware of the ‘ethical’ determinations of a time and
place of discourse. One may even wish to hear this indirect injunction in the
following, seemingly unrelated passage from H. C. for Life, That Is to Say . . . , when
Derrida reminisces over Cixous’s vision of him walking along a crest, being thus
‘placed too high’ and deprived of sides, edges and safeguards:
[ . . . ] I thus saw myself raised, doomed not to put a foot wrong or
step to one side [ pas de coˆte´ ] once, without the slightest safeguard,
closer than ever to the fall or the unforgivable mistake. So I would
have no side at all, no side for sidestepping [ pas de coˆte´ pour un pas de
coˆte´ ]. That’s why now I do not know where to put myself [ou` me tenir ].
[ . . . ] I’d just better stay put [ je n’ai qu’a` bien me tenir ].20
And soon after,21 Derrida instructs us to reread Cixous’s whole oeuvre, starting with
La, for the relationship between those sides ‘here’ and ‘there’ (la`) and (se) tenir as well
as its prepositional derivations. Cixous, whom he had praised for her generalized ‘art
of substitution’ (remplacement), which had provided the subtitle of her French the`se
d’e´tat on James Joyce.
Variations on such teneur and especially tenue are given a more explicitly ethical spin in
one ofDerrida’s seminars onabsolute, im-possible hospitality, or ‘hostipitality’,where a
whole derivative kinship, an ‘eco-nomy’ of language and etymology, is explored:
Being-present as absent for the hoˆte? Must one be there (living, or
surviving, or not)? [ . . . ] The hoˆte always passing through (road and
itinerary, iterability: come: come back [viens: reviens ]). But must one
hold back [re-tenir ] the passing hoˆte? When does holding back and
retaining [retenir ] him become detaining [de´tenir ] the other as
hostage? (to hold, to hold the other, to entertain and support
[entre-tenir ] the hoˆte (entertain and sustain [ . . . ]).
[ . . . ]
[ . . . ] a seminar onhospitality is amediation and an exercise of language
or of writing about all the possible statements that one can let ‘hold’
(to hold dear, to maintain, retain, entertain and support, detain
[tenir, maintenir, retenir, entretenir, de´tenir ] but also ‘letting [laisser ]’ [ . . . ].22
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These can be read alongside the recall of what a hostage means and implies, from the
short essay also titled ‘Hostipitality’: ‘the hostage is a guarantee for the other, held in
a place and taking its place’ [tenu dans un lieu et tenant lieu ].’23 It is to this place (lieu),
in particular in the self-deconstructing phrase au lieu de and what ‘takes place’ in or
with(out) it (tenir lieu de), that I would like to hold on, after going off on a tangent,
via Derrida’s reflections on a more ‘homely’ form of the con-: the experience of (con)
tact and touching.
Place Holders I – Contingencies and contiguities (noli me ten[d ]ere)
Organized around a haptological framework of four philosophemes (extension,
partes extra partes, to touch, to touch oneself)24 and offering a piecemeal history of the
philosophy of ‘tact’ in interrelated touches, Derrida’s masterly study On Touching –
Jean-Luc Nancy extends the ‘sense of touch’ between the cognate families of tenir
(Latin tenere) and tendre (tendere - . entendre: to hear, understand [from intendere: to
spread, ‘tend’ towards]). Such is the thematic spread of Derrida’s analyses that a
recapitulative summary of its main relevant ‘points’ of articulation is first called for,
in quick programmatic shorthand:
– the inaugural ‘point’ or break of dawn (le jour point) and the discussion of Psyche’s
corporeal ‘extension’ (e´tendue), intact, intangible and untouchable (OT, 3, 17, 16);
– the following ‘parenthesis’ on ‘spacing’ or ‘the absolute condition of any
extension’ (OT, 20) and ‘the tactile figure of pure auto-affection’ in se toucher (OT,
32; cf. also p. 34);25
– the law of tact26 as im-possible touch-without-touching (de´liaison again,27 or the
disjunction of contact in the caress28);
– the necessity to ‘extend an ear’ (entendre) otherwise to the relation between ‘to
tend(er)’ (tendre), intentional, and ‘tender’ (tendre, i.e. what is soft to the touch /
touches the heart), non-intentional (OT, 94), the latter being at the origin of
ethics (OT, 92);
– the interruptive touch of the (reflexive or reciprocal) se toucher (interruption in
contact, untouchable touchable, etc.; OT, 111 ff.), and the relation between
prosthetic supplementarity and the spacing-out in contact in Nancy’s corpus
(OT, 129);
– the five digressive ‘Tangents’ – ‘five, like the five fingers of the hand, like the five
senses’ (OT, 182) – which in their contingent as well as tangential29 ‘impertinent
pertinence [ . . . ] touch[ . . . ] only one point’ (OT, 131), focusing on the
teleological ‘exemplarity’ of the hand (main);30
– the closing ‘Punctuations’ (from punctum: point) on a new form of auto-hetero-
affection (since there can be no touching / being touched by the other without
first touching oneself): ‘se toucher-toi’ (to self-touch you) – featuring, at one point,
‘la tienne’, a homophone tactfully tensed between ‘yours’ and a subjunctive form of
tenir31 – before a ‘Final Retouch’ or Salve, ‘[a] nightless, dayless point’ (‘[ p ]oint de
nuit [ . . . ] point de jour’), ‘[t]o the point, the break of dawn’ (‘Au point du jour.’)32
A book also about ‘the metonymies of touch’ and prosthesis (but also transplants) as
‘the metonymic substitute[s]’ (OT, 17, 19; also 286), one of its motifs, structuring the
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linguistically densest passage of ‘Tangent IV’, is tenir lieu (de) (to take the place of), a
phrase which Derrida had already ascribed to the ‘supplement’ in his early essay on
Rousseau33 and which is here redeployed in relation to the spacing of touching as
con-tact, as the experience itself of (an ecotechnic and prosthetic) contact. The
idiomatic sequence, whose near-untranslatability is noted by Derrida himself,34 will
be given both in the original and in English, and will be used as a metonymic
touchstone for what follows:
A lieu et tient lieu: a lieu tout en tenant lieu, a lieu pour tenir lieu – par le fait
de tenir lieu et en vue de tenir lieu: a lieu de tenir lieu: tenant lieu d’avoir lieu.35
Taking place and taking the place of: taking place while taking the place of,
taking place in lieu of taking the place of – by virtue of taking the place of and in
view of taking the place of: held (in place) to taking the place of: taking the
place of taking place. (OT, 221)
Among so many reasons and pretexts of friendship which could be adduced to
account for Derrida’s enduring interest in Nancy’s work is no doubt the latter’s
conception of an ‘inoperative community’, which tacitly informs his sense of touch
and con-tact as both ‘participation and partition’ but, in retaining the word
‘community’, is ultimately at odds with Derrida’s generalized mistrust of the one
and common.36 After quoting from Nancy’s Being Singular Plural, Derrida further
comments on ‘the law of parting and sharing at the heart of touching’, whose spacing37
points to his ‘“inoperative community”’, another ethics of ‘“the other of the with”’
(OT, 199; also 200: ‘time to space itself’, ‘dis-tension’), not unlike his own effort to
imagine a community without community, or co-immunity (i.e. without the name),
which we can now gloss as a tactful touching (one/self-other) otherwise. Derrida’s
‘interruptive community’ (as it could now be called) is ‘the interruptive experience
of the syncope’ (OT, 162), a dissociative ethics of the relation to the other as de´liaison
(which one could interpret as the abstraction of the bond from the binding) and an
irreducibility of the other in the experience of touching (OT, 223) which opposes the
more traditional ‘community as co-tact’ (OT, 115).38
As Hillis Miller rightly pointed out, On Touching is ruled by a general metonymics
whereby touch-related words substitute (for) one another in an incessant contiguity
which ultimately can only tangentially touch upon touch (as upon Nancy on
touching), the untouchability of touch-without-touching, or sole propriety of these
improper, ‘impertinent’ ‘concepts’ since they all oscillate undecidably between the
literal and the figurative.39 To recast and extend Mallarme´’s famous maxim often
invoked by Derrida himself (rien n’aura eu lieu que le lieu): ‘nothing takes place but
place’ while metonymically taking the place of (OT, 17). Such generalizable
substitutability – which likewise affects the quasi-synonymic chains of nonce words
that traverse Derridean deconstruction – demarcates the fundamentally atopic,
secret and elusive, ‘dislocated’ place of Derrida’s writings which cannot ‘stay in
place’ (ne tiennent pas en place, as one would say in French) and instead stage an
affirmative place which is ‘not a place that really exists’,40 ‘a place that is not a place,
a place-no-place where events take place without taking place’.41
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Derrida’s suspensive final ‘point’ to his last ‘Tangent’ – after contrasting Chre´tien’s
and Nancy’s conceptions of touch, incarnation and corpus as ‘[t]wo ways of thinking
substitution’ –suggestively ties together spacing (emplacement), khora, substitution
(remplacement) and hospitality in a way that will provide us with a convenient
stepping stone if one bears in mind his earlier statement, inThe Gift of Death, that ‘[t]
he ethical involves me in substitution’:42
What there would remain to think is the place, the placing of this
replacing, or the neutral spacing (chora, I might say), that would still
extend its hospitality to this virtual substitution of substitution, unless
it should detain [retienne ] it forever as a hostage. (OT, 262)43
Place Holders II – In (the) Place of
In the Seminar on ‘Hostipitality’, within a context which probes into the
significance of using a hostage to political ends while thus resorting to an ‘ethics of
substitution’, Derrida muses on the meaning of substitution, which the classical
French dictionary Littre´ defines as the ‘action that consists in putting a thing, a
person in the place of [a` la place de ] another’. Derrida further reflects:
In the place of – locution which names the occupied space, the destined
location [emplacement ], natural or not, even the lodging, the habitat,
the lieu (one also says, for substitution, ‘ceci au lieu de cela’), ‘at the place
of’ [‘a` la place de,’ ‘au lieu de,’ ‘en lieu et place de’] [ . . . ]44
If, for something called ‘communication’ to ‘take place’, it is the pre-condition that
any sign (which Derrida prefers to call ‘trace’, ‘gram’, ‘mark’, etc.)45 be iterable,
graftable and thus be able to operate in absentia rather than merely in the here and
now of a unique, original utterance (‘Signature Event Context’), this universal
singularity comes up against the logic of substitution – or rather the absence thereof –
in the case of death and witnessing. This issue is taken up in Demeure, a patient,
detailed study of Maurice Blanchot’s short, enigmatic semi-autobiographical text
The Instant of My Death, which contrasts Celan’s momentous statement ‘Niemand zeugt
fu¨r den Zeugen’ (nobody witnesses for the witness) with a quotation from Blanchot’s
The Step Not Beyond associating attestation with the Neuter, ‘the singular place of a
passion beyond the opposition of passive and active’46 – and let us recall in passing
that, within some fifteen years of each other, diffe´rance and khoˆrawere equally defined
as neither passive nor active.47
Demeure also dwells, is built on Derrida’s attempt to locate the testimonial, juridical,
etc. dimensions of the French idioms mise en demeure, a` demeure and suchlike,
undecidably caught between the impossibility of deciding and the impossibility of
remaining [demeurer ] in the undecidable,48 i.e. the aporia of the critical, ethical
moment or ‘point of decision (as well as interpretation):
I will attempt to speak of this necessary but impossible abidance
[demeurance ] of the abode [demeure ]. How can one decide what
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remains abidingly [a` demeure ]? How is one to hear the term - the noun
or the verb, the adverbial phrases – ‘abode’ [la demeure],’ ‘that which
abides [ce qui demeure],’ ‘that which holds abidingly [ce qui se tient a`
demeure],’ ‘that by which one must abide [ce qui met en demeure]’?49
Further on, the inessentiality and ‘space’ of literature – which for Derrida has the
right to say any- and everything (le droit de tout dire)50 – is affirmed as a lastingly
untenable place, a ‘passion’ as ‘the endurance of an indeterminate or undecidable
limit’, resisting being maintained in a place:
There is no essence or substance of literature: literature is not. It does
not exist. It does not remain at home, abidingly [a` demeure] in the
identity of a nature or even of a historical being identical with itself.
It does not maintain itself abidingly [a` demeure ], at least if ‘abode
[demeure ]’ designates the essential stability of a place; it only remains
[demeure ] where and if ‘to be abidingly [eˆtre a` demeure ]’ in some ‘abiding
order [mise en demeure ]’ means something else.51
One reason why literature is so special and should be upheld – including against
those that would want to legislate over its contents (and here one should not forget
Derrida’s instrumental role in setting up the International Parliament of Writers at
the time of the fatwa against Rushdie) – is that its irreducibly undecidable status,
between fiction and testimony, even for instance when a text claims to be a truthful
autobiography, its defiance of a stable, stabilized, ‘maintained’ resting place, confers
upon it the privilege of being the utmost test for, and experience of, the suspension of
judgment. In the 1987 intervention at the Colle`ge International de Philosophie
forum on ‘Ethics and Politics’ alluded to in the beginning, Derrida had already
outlined in not dissimilar terms the possibility of a new place or space beyond ethics
as it is usually constrained to a decisional space in our society, a non-space of the
form X without X to which he will return time and again in the 1990s:
What you have just evoked is a zone of experience; it is on the basis of
nondecision, not of indecision but of nondecision, that the decision
emerges. I would completely agree with you in making me attentive
to this experience that is not commanded by a decision. I would
simply have some reservation when you call this space a political or
ethical space. I think that, in our tradition and in our society, when we
think of ethics and politics, a decision is irreducible. The moment of
the decision one cannot do without it. And this community, this
dimension of being together that would not be ruled by the necessity
of decision, I am very attentive to it, indeed, but I will not define it as
ethical or political. There are, perhaps, dimensions of the community,
of being together – the word community has always bothered me a
little – of being together in the interruption, as one says today, in a
relation without relation, which are, perhaps, neither ethical nor
political. But when there are ethics and politics – at that moment, one
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must decide. [ . . . ] And what one calls ethics or politics in our culture, is
the moment at which one cannot not decide. There are decisions to be
made, which are inevitable, and not decide is still to decide. The
space of the decision here is irreducible. This does not prevent us from
thinking of something that is before or after or further . . . This does
not prevent us from being-in-the-other or from opening, from
knowing that a space is open with the other in which this decisionism
does not take place. Nevertheless, there are places where it takes
place. And this taking place is what one calls, I think, the ethical and
the political in our society.52
Taking place, here and now: this is what politics and ethics are also (said to be)
eventually about, as Derrida recalls in ‘Force of Law’ in relation to the instant of
madness of the just decision, whose urgency and precipitation necessarily interrupts
the juridico-ethico-political status quo and order.53 Propr(i)ety or the appropriate-
ness of place is also at issue in the second part of Khoˆra when it alludes to the Socratic
discourse, featured towards the opening of Plato’s Timaeus, which distinguishes
between philosophers and politicians, both having a proper place (‘ont lieu’),54 versus
the poets and sophists who migrate from place to place, and the non-place which
Socrates feigns to occupy in his address, ‘in the neutral space or a place without
place’.55 Hence Derrida’s comment in Archive Fever that the virtual ‘takes place’
otherwise and by necessity makes us renegotiate ‘the full and effective actuality of the
taking-place, the reality [ . . . ] of the archived event’,56 and more crucially, towards
the end of Specters of Marx, his call to rethink what we still unquestionably place
under ‘politics’, and the age-old, implicit conception of the political space of
‘representation’ still bound with presence in spite of all the emergent tele-
technologies.57 It is from this usual place for politics and ethics that deconstruction
aims to demarcate a non-place that will reveal those constitutive differences in
placements and bring to light the ‘ante-primal’ (avant-premier)58 idiom for absolute
responsibility, not the question of (the ‘present’ of) being and essence (es gibt Sein)
but the issue of place: il y a lieu (de), as one says in French about the injunction of a
dictating necessity. A pre-critical, pre-ethical non-space upon which the possibility
of any ethos is therefore conditional, which I would now like to summon by another
untranslatable term, borrowed from legal discourse: non-lieu (lit.: non-place), used
when a plaintiff is debarred from a case and a verdict is returned by not being
returned, when conditions for the exercise of justice are not met.
‘Non-lieu’, or, How to be just in (the) place of ethics59
[ . . . ] justly mad; just to be mad; just like a certain kind of madness (OT, 56)
Originally collected in the 1987 Poikilia for Jean-Pierre Vernant, the essay on the
Platonic khoˆra elaborates the difficult reading/translation of the non-place of such a
‘place’, which gives rise to – donne lieu – without giving anything like an essential
place or foundation,60 a spacing (diffe´rance) in a withdrawal of ‘the place’ from
‘place’, place without place. As opposed to the presence-as-reference/referent of a
negativized essence in the via negativa or negative theology, khoˆra is neither a
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reference nor a referent, a ‘(non-)place’ which ‘takes place’ [a lieu ] without a place
instead – au lieu de: ‘There is khoˆra but the khoˆra does not exist.’61 Or in Mallarme´’s
celebrated poetic formula again, rien n’aura eu lieu que le lieu; but a taking place as the
pre-originary spacing of pre-critical diffe´rance.
One of the significant additions to the 1993 republication in book form of the essay
on khoˆra is the framing opening echo of the arrivant, which, in the context of
contemporaneous writings like Aporias and Specters of Marx, testifies to the discreet
recentring on issues of ethics, responsibility and the messianic, of Derrida’s
meditations on a more originary, unanticipatable, ante-primal ‘place’. His opening
in the original, ‘Khoˆra nous arrive . . . ’,62 allows us to reread this necessary prior-to-
the-first place or pre-originary (non-)place as absolute giving as well as pre-given,
though not of an essential kind, which conditions subsequent determinations of
places and from which questions of ethics, hospitality or responsibility towards the
Other, etc. ought to be asked for their radical legitimacy. An aporetic topography
combined with a necessity to apprehend ‘an abyss in these places’, to which Derrida will
return in ‘Faith and Knowledge’,63with the abstract ‘figuration’ of the desert within
the desert, that ante-primal withdrawal of place from place or ‘retreat’ [retraite ], an
aporetic space that gives place to, and thus enables the various discourses on, ethics
to take place – a double aporia since the retreat within also means withdrawal,
without, as in the unbinding within the communal, the relation without relation in
society, or re-ligion without re-ligion.64 Thus, for Derrida, the religious without
religion would be the originary lien sans lien (de´liaison) that would make possible the
gathering together without / before community or sociality (‘the social nexus’) that
erases subjectivities in the name of a promised collectivity and revealed universality,
the free inhabiting together of / Mitsein in a place. If ‘Before the Law’ il y a lieu
(one must, it is necessary),65 such anteriority, before the necessary foundation of law-
as-justice posited in ‘Force of Law’, can only take place as the risk of critical
suspensiveness in the non-lieu of justice-to-come.66
I began by alluding to the timely re-reading of Derrida, which, from the late 1980s
onwards, set out to ethicize deconstruction, usually with a Levinasian agenda.
A recent challenge to this historically necessary corrective came from Martin
Ha¨gglund’s razor-sharp Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life, which mined the
hitherto untapped significance of Derrida’s mention of a violent ‘nonethical opening
of ethics’ in Of Grammatology67 in conjunction with the becoming-space of time and
becoming-time of space in diffe´rance to mount a cogent claim for deconstruction’s
assertion of an inaugural arche-violence and radical evil in the opening of life.
Kicking off with an outline of the ‘ultratranscendental’ trace-structure of time and
‘succession’ in general in order to argue for the autoimmunity of life and emphasize
that human desire for immortality is in fact a desire for survival, Radical Atheism then
takes head-on in three successive chapters three reductive readings of Derridean
deconstruction in terms of ethics (Critchley, Bernasconi, Drucilla Cornell),68
religion (Caputo) and politics (Laclau, via Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis).
Ha¨gglund’s strategy throughout is to highlight a common lack of ‘radicality’,
stemming from critics’ failure to gauge the importance of the trace-structure and
autoimmunity, around correlated sets of themes that include the unconditionality of
hospitality in relation to an ethics of alterity, the religious ideal of absolute
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immunity, and the desire for plenitude in political commitment to ‘justice’ and
‘democracy’. These sites of contention subsequently gave rise to several debates and
polemics, among which those with Laclau (on the role of the desire and ‘drive for
survival’ versus Laclau’s hegemonic ‘drive for fullness’ in radical politics), Attridge
(on the ethical relation between conditional and unconditional hospitality,
calculability and incalculability) and Caputo (on the uncontaminated priority of
the good, equated with ‘God’, in his ‘weak theology’ versus autoimmunity, radical
evil (both from ‘Faith and Knowledge’) and Ha¨gglund’s logic of radical atheism –
displacing a former debate on the relation between deconstruction and negative
theology – are perhaps the most notorious as they bear more crucially on the core of
Ha¨gglund’s trenchant project.69 While in some respects these various controversies
and interventions are intricately enmeshed, I will avail myself of Ha¨gglund’s
Nietzschean penchant ‘to philosophize with the hammer’70 and forcefully extract
those ethics-related strands in his replies and responses that more specifically
dovetail with the arguments and scope of this essay.
A central charge against Ha¨gglund is his failure to operate a more interruptive
‘contaminating logics’ typical of deconstruction, rather than performing dialectical
reversals (Laclau), as well as the ‘one-sidedness’ of his conception of hospitality as a
prime instance of the relationship to the other, which voids any ethics of
unconditional hospitality of the power to decide in front of the event (Attridge).71
Indeed, for Ha¨gglund, it is not ‘unconditional hospitality to otherness’ which is
ethical, since unconditionality is a necessary condition of the event’s unpredict-
ability and ‘[u]nconditional hospitality is thus another name for the exposure to
temporal alterity’,72 but the resulting need to calculate with incalculable
circumstances in order to be able to make justifiable decisions. Hence, the following
clear-cut position, backed up by key passages from Derrida’s more recent texts as
evidence which are worth quoting more fully:
The ethical is therefore a matter of responding to alterity by making
decisions and calculations, whereas the unconditional is the non-
ethical opening of ethics, namely, the exposure to an undecidable
other that makes it necessary to decide and calculate in the first
place.73
I have always, consistently and insistently, held unconditional hospitality,
as impossible, to be heterogeneous to the political, the juridical, and even the
ethical. But the impossible is not nothing. It is even that which
happens, which comes, by definition. [ . . . ] There are, it is true,
paradoxical or aporetic relations between two concepts that are at
once heterogeneous and inseparable, unconditional hospitality and conditional
hospitality (that is, the only one, let me repeat it, that belongs to the
order of laws, rules, and norms - whether ethical, juridical, or political
[ . . . ].74
Political, juridical, and ethical responsibilities have their place, if they
take place, only in this transaction - which is each time unique, like an
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event - between these two hospitalities, the unconditional and the
conditional.75
Therefore, for Ha¨gglund, ‘[w]hat Derrida describes under the heading of
unconditional hospitality is [ . . . ] the non-ethical opening of ethics’ and ‘[t]he
task of deconstructive analysis is not to choose between calculation and the
incalculable, but to articulate their co-implication and the autoimmunity that
follows from it.’76
Co-implication (of the conditional and unconditional, calculable and incalculable,
but also of evil in good, death in life, etc.) is a crucial argumentative fulcrum here and
elsewhere, and one should not forget that it already operates in the reversible
formulation of diffe´rance linking spacing and temporality. Its logic also haunts another
recurrent facet in these polemics: the strangely enduring ‘critical’ opposition between
the internal and the external which Ha¨gglund’s interlocutors often insist on
maintaining, in spite of Derrida’s near-constant problematization of margins, limits
and borders, parergonal effects of inscription, or specific texts like ‘TheOutside Is the
Inside’ (Of Grammatology) and ‘Fors’, on the untenability of a topical distinction
between introjection and incorporation, an inner or outer forum of the self
( for inte´rieur or public forum), etc. Hence, for Ha¨gglund (to redirect Laclau’s own
critique), Caputo’s pious argument about the priority of the good is still entrenched in
a set of binary, deconstructible oppositions – between the originary, internal promise
(good) and the externally derived threat (evil) – and fails to grasp the structural
necessity and logical co-implication that always already operates and autoimmunely
contaminates or ‘haunts’ from within.77 Restaged in terms of diffe´rance, the
unconditional is ‘the co-implication of time and space that [Derrida] calls spacing.’78
The insistence on the structural inscription79 of radical autoimmunity – to recall that
the Derridean formula developed by Ha¨gglund, ‘the nonethical opening of ethics’,
was first ventured in conjunction with archi-e´criture, and since Caputo objects to
Ha¨gglund’s choice of ‘descriptive’ (vs. prescriptive) – is reminiscent of the even
fiercer debate that had pitted Derrida and Lacan (and their respective followers)
against each other about the joint issues – and the necessary correlation in Lacan’s
interpretive system of the Seminar – of the non-partitivity of the letter and its sure-
fire arrival at its destination in Poe’s tale of ‘The Purloined Letter’, a Lacanian
‘desire for plenitude’ countered by Derrida’s structural ‘law’ of dissemination and
destinerrance:
The divisibility of the letter [ . . . ] is what chances and sets off course,
without guarantee of return, the remaining [restance ] of anything
whatsoever: a letter does not always arrive at its destination, and from
the moment that this possibility belongs to its structure one can say
that it never truly arrives, that when it does arrive its capacity not to
arrive torments it with an internal drifting.80
Thus, and comparably, Ha¨gglund is right to insist on what I will rephrase as the self-
divisibility of/within autoimmunity (as in Derrida’s use of the double-edged sauf par:
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save by in ‘Faith and Knowledge’ to counter religion’s desire for the unscathed81),
for which Caputo refuses to make allowances in his apprehension of deconstruction
as ‘ankhoˆral religion without religion’. To use another ‘privative’ formula, I would
venture that the over-zealous ethicization of Derrida has also resulted in a
paradoxical ‘ethics without ethics’, which subtracts the dimension of spacing and of
the dis-location of place (ethos) from deconstruction and ultimately dismisses the
autoimmunitary dimension of the nonethical opening of ethics. A non-lieu has been
dispensed unjustly in place of the differential (non-)lieu of deconstruction . . .
Whereas many of the polemics that ensued from Ha¨gglund’s Radical Atheism dealt, in
one way or another, with the temporal dimension and anchoring of his project
(‘taking [the] time [to live]’), the aim of this essay, and its arc from the spacing of
main-tenance to the non-lieu, was also to ‘relocate’ Derrida’s alleged ‘ethical turn’82
squarely within the broader context of his long-standing thinking of place and
‘taking place’, which is indissociable from some of the major structural operators of
deconstruction, such as diffe´rance. More specifically, its belated contribution to the
recent debates surrounding deconstruction and ethics lies in its attempt to articulate
the ‘(non-)place’ of the ethical in Derrida as a reformulation of the violent spacing
(‘becoming-space of time’) at work in ‘the nonethical opening of ethics’.83
Such in my view is Derrida’s call for a more archaic, ‘ethical’ place (without place),
out of place and out of time – his maintenance or, in Specters of Marx, ‘the dis-
adjustment of the con-temporary’84 – the desert within the desert of what the French
double syntax calls ‘le risque en demeure inde´niable’85 rather than a mise en demeure, abs-
tracted, sub-tracted through an abyssal hollowing out of the desert, of what ‘place’
and ‘in (the) place of’ (au lieu de) mean, and which famously prompted Emmanuel
Levinas to observe, in ‘Jacques Derrida: Wholly Otherwise’, that Philosophy’s
panorama, before and after Derrida, shifts from ‘everything is in place’ to ‘nothing is
left inhabitable for thought’, ‘everything is [ . . . ] left desolate’.86
Notes
1 Derrida, Specters of Marx, xiii. About the ‘non-
contemporaneity with itself of the living present’ see also
24–25, 39, 73, 75.
2 See Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction and the
two items under ‘Bernasconi’ in the Bibliography.
In his more recent Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity,
Critchley still traces the ethical potential of
Derrida’s work to Levinasian ethical experience.
3 Derrida addresses this point for e.g. in Nego-
tiations, 302 (‘Ethics and Politics Today’).
4 Derrida, Of Hospitality, 45 (see also 23). The
equation between ethos and habitus is also
mentioned in the title essay of Negotiations, 13,
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used to describe the global place of Derrida’s
infinite ethics in The Gift of Death, 69.
5 See Derrida, Acts of Religion, 364 (‘Hostipi-
tality’): ‘Hospitality is the deconstruction of the at-
home; deconstruction is hospitality to the other
[ . . . ]’, and the famous axiomatic equation
‘Deconstruction is justice’ in ‘Force of Law,’ 243.
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local proximity, and temporal proximity (Le Tre´sor
de la Langue Francaise informatise´ online, at http://
atilf.atilf.fr/tlf.html, s. v. ‘maintenant’).
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essay: understanding how in Derridean thought
the insistent motif of the avenir / a` venir or time to
come, which is reduced to an eternal deferment of
politics by its detractors – justice-to-come,
democracy-to-come, but also a more aprioric,
disjunctive messianicity without messianism to
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assimilated into a theological (Jewish) tradition, of
the kind which has been recently traced out in
Levine, A Weak Messianic Power, nor even with
Walter Benjamin’s historico-materialist notion of
‘weak messianic power’, in spite of some degree of
consonance; see Derrida, Specters of Marx, 181, n. 2
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ethically. Disjointed time, on the other hand,
allows Derrida to view the future-to-come as the
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Sons’.
9 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 328.
10 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, especially in
‘Diffe´rance’: ‘The use of language or the employ-
ment of any code which implies a play of forms
[ . . . ] also presupposes a retention and protention
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of traces.’ (146)
11 Derrida, ‘No (Point of) Madness,’ especially 90,
91. Hereafter NPM with page references in the
text. For a chronology of Derrida’s ten-year-long
engagement with architecture (1984–1993) and
an examination of the relation between the present
and the politics of space and place (‘ontopology’;
Derrida, Specters of Marx, 82), see Vitale, ‘Jacques
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‘The Law of the Oikos’, which refers to Derrida’s
unpublished 1985–86 seminar ‘Nationalite´
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in his discussion of khora.
12 Let us also recall, after Derrida, that atopos:
without place, also meant ‘mad’ or ‘extravagant’
in Greek. See Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking,’
163, and Geneses, Genealogies, Genres, and Geniuses, 59.
Derrida has often quoted or alluded to Kierke-
gaard’s famous, if elusive maxim ‘the instant of
decision is madness’ ever since it featured as the
first epigraph to his 1963 lecture on Foucault,
‘Cogito and the History of Madness’ – see
Bennington, ‘A Moment of Madness’ – which
can be regarded as a ‘watchword’ for deconstruc-
tion as invention and its frequent self-determi-
nation as ‘the experience of the impossible’. See for
e.g. the interview ‘A “Madness” Must Watch over
Thinking,’ in Points . . . , 363, and On Touching, 57,
which associates the madness of thinking the event
with ‘the impossible is what takes place’.
13 See Derrida’s essay ‘Fifty-two Aphorisms,’ in
Papadakis, Deconstruction Omnibus Volume, 68 (no.
29), and also 72, in the following discussion with
Chris Norris.
14 Derrida, Psyche. Inventions de l’autre, 492. Cf.
NPM, 102.
15 Derrida, in Brunette and Wills, ‘The Spatial
Arts,’ 27.
16 What John Caputo, combining it with khora as
place without (the) place, called ‘ankhoˆral religion
without religion’; see Caputo, The Prayers and Tears
of Jacques Derrida, 189.
17 For this ‘interruptive unravelling’ (de´liaison) as
the condition of the social bond of a ‘community’,
of a bond (socius or desmos) without bond, see for
example Derrida, ‘Faith and Knowledge,’
especially 64.
18 Derrida, ‘Faith and Knowledge,’ 51.
19 Derrida recalls that it is within a certain
experience of spacing and space that resistance to
philosophical authority can be produced. See
Brunette andWills, ‘The Spatial Arts,’ 19, and also
Derrida’s contemporaneous essay ‘Fifty-two
Aphorisms,’ in Papadakis, Deconstruction Omnibus
Volume, especially 68 (no. 26), about ‘to make space’,
which states that the ‘aphorism’, succinctly
described as ‘un point c’est tout’ (68, no. 25), has
‘no inhabitable place’, ‘[n]o housing’ (68–69, nos.
40, 41), and concludes: ‘To maintain [ . . . ], despite
all the reappropriations, the chance of the
aphorism, is to keep [ . . . ] the promise of making
room for [donner lieu ] [ . . . ]’ (69, no. 52).
20 Derrida,H. C. for Life, 49. This episode was first
evoked in a 1992 talk by Cixous herself on the
occasion of the ten-day conference ‘Le passage des
frontie`res’; see Cixous, ‘What is it o’clock?,’ 48.
21 Derrida, H. C. for Life, 50–51.
22 Derrida, Acts of Religion, 408–09 (‘Hostipi-
tality’).
23 Derrida, ‘Hostipitality,’ 9.
24 Derrida, On Touching, 16; hereafter OT with
page references in the text.
25 Commenting on Nancy’s The Experience of
Freedom, this second chapter of the first part
associates spacing, decision and ethos (OT, 21–
22), considering the mouth as the opening that
spaces itself out, at once place and non-place of a
dis-location (OT, 28–29).
26 Formulated in French, as on the ‘model’ of
cendre and khoˆra: ‘il y a la` loi du tact’; see Derrida,
Le toucher, 82.
Milesi
64
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
TPAR 988908—5/1/2015—SATHISHKUMAR.K—500448—Own Style
27 Derrida, Le toucher, 86.
28 ‘toucher sans toucher [ . . . ], donner sans
retenir, mais avec retenue, donner a` tenir sans
tenir [ . . . ]: tiens !’ (Derrida, Le toucher, 91); cf. On
Touching, 76. There is no space here to do justice to
the untranslatable versatility of the French
imperative tiens!
29 Derrida, Le toucher, 151 – cf. OT, 131, which
strangely omits the first adjective; these also form
part of the chain of subtitles for Tangents IV andV.
30 Just as touch has often featured in philosophical
tradition as the essential metonymy of the
‘community’ of senses par excellence (OT, passim).
See also Derrida, ‘Heidegger’s Hand,’ and chapter
11 of Hillis Miller’s For Derrida (‘Touching Derrida
Touching Nancy’), especially 285 ff.
31 And elided in the translation; compare Le toucher
314, and OT, 278.
32 See Derrida, Le toucher, 343, and OT, 307.
33 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 145 (‘That Danger-
ous Supplement . . . ’).
34 Derrida has often evoked deconstruction as an
(other) experience of the (im-possible) translation,
here subsequently defined as an event which ‘a lieu
de tenir lieu’ (Le toucher, 251); cf. OT, 221.
35 Derrida, Le toucher, 249.
36 See Derrida, A Taste for the Secret, 25.
37 Spacing (‘spacing space’), and the sharing of
being and singularities as spacing, is also evoked in
the discussion of Nancy’s The Experience of Freedom
in Rogues, 46, 50.
38 See also Rogues, 153, which discusses ‘the
incalculable event’, ‘the irreducible spacing of the
very faith, credit, or belief without which there
would be no social bond [ . . . ]’.
39 Miller, For Derrida, 270, 273.
40 Derrida, in Brunette and Wills, ‘The Spatial
Arts,’ 26, who then relates it to Blanchot’s ‘come
[viens ]’.
41 Miller, ‘Derrida’s Topographies,’ 307; also
196–7. Cf. Anne Berger’s shrewd formulation to
Derrida in the interview ‘“Dialanguages”’: ‘It
would be as if, in a certain way, you knew the place
that would allow you to write it [i.e. the book to be
written], as if you had found it, and at the same
time it were lost to you.’ (Points . . . , 149).
42 See Derrida, The Gift of Death, 61. The
sacrificial violence at the heart of this substitut-
ability is performatively at work in Derrida’s
deceptively non-tautological catchword ‘tout autre
est tout autre’ (68 and chap. 4, 82 ff.) and in the
subsequent passage: ‘As soon as I enter into a
relation with the other [ . . . ], I know that I can
respond only by sacrificing ethics, that is, by
sacrificing whatever obliges me to also respond, in
the same way, in the same instant, to all the
others.’
43 For another conjunction of khora and spacing,
see Rogues, 82, but also xiv as ‘another “taking-
place,” the irreplaceable place or placement of a
“desert in the desert”’.
44 Derrida, Acts of Religion, 416 (‘Hostipitality’).
45 For a succinct development of this substitution,
see Milesi, ‘Semiology and Deconstruction’.
46 Derrida, Demeure, 31.
47 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 9 (‘Diffe´rance’);
‘How to Avoid Speaking,’ 173. For a correlation
between ‘differential space’, conceived as between
‘temporal-messianic’ and geometrical (ideal), and
khora (‘Derrida’s attempt to recast diffe´rance in
[ . . . ] its [ . . . ] spatial [aspect]’), see for e.g. Srajek,
In the Margins of Deconstruction, 241 (245), and the
whole section on ‘Khora’ (241–46).
48 Compare with Derrida, The Beast and the
Sovereign, 173: ‘The point is that it is a matter of
indecision or an indeterminacy between a deter-
minacy and an indeterminacy.’
49 Derrida, Demeure, 16.
50 See Derrida, ‘“This Strange Institution Called
Literature,”’ 36.
51 Derrida, Demeure, 28.
52 Derrida, Negotiations, 311–12 (‘Ethics and
Politics’).
53 Derrida, ‘Force of Law,’ 255.
54 See Derrida, Khoˆra, 55 – in English: ‘Khora,’
107.
55 Derrida, ‘Khoˆra,’ 109. In Architectural Philosophy,
Andrew Benjamin poses as a ‘legitimate’ conse-
quence of the ‘foundational’ question about the
place that generates all places – the ‘logic of
khora’ – the question of the ‘place of the question
of place’, as the question which ‘cannot be
included within that which it is taken to found’,
‘the problem of the foundation of both law and
ethos’ (13 ff. [15, 14]) analogous to the ‘forceful’
foundation of law-as-justice in ‘Force of Law’.
The lieu sans lieu can be traced back to Blanchot’s
use of the formula in The Infinite Conversation, 385
(‘The Absence of the Book’, about the neutral),
and Friendship, 116 (see also 47). As if to tacitly
point to a common leitmotif, it was finally reprised
towards the end of a 1990 homage to the French
philosopher; see Blanchot, ‘Thanks (Be Given) to
Jacques Derrida,’ 323 (‘(atopical) place without
place’).
56 Derrida, Archive Fever, 66.
57 Derrida, Specters of Marx, especially 163, 169.
58 For this notion, see Derrida, Monolingualism of
the Other, 64 (‘prior-to-the-first’), 67–69, 71; and
‘Faith and Knowledge,’ 21, about the ‘chora’ or
‘desert in the desert’ – for which see also Milesi,
‘Thinking (Through) the Desert’.
59 In what follows, the more ironic, self-decon-
structing ambiguity of ‘just’ should also be borne in
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mind, as in the self-assumed ‘je suis juste en tant que
Juif’: I am just (about) as a Jew, however missed
out in the translation of ‘Abraham, the Other,’ 11.
See also Milesi, ‘Portrait of H. C. as J. D. and
Back,’ 76, and 78–79 in connection with the
intersecting motif, first uttered in ‘Circumfession’’
of ‘le dernier des Juifs’ (the l(e)ast of the Jews).
60 For the deconstruction of this term, see Derrida,
‘Force of Law,’ 230–98, and ‘Faith and Knowl-
edge,’ 19 (about the ‘desert’ as found(er)ing).
61 Derrida, ‘Khora,’ 97. The ‘epochality’ of such
[a] place is an event; see Derrida, ‘How to Avoid
Speaking,’ 173.
62 Derrida, Khoˆra, 15; imprecisely translated as,
simply, ‘reaches us’ in the English version (‘Khora,’
89).
63 Derrida, ‘Faith and Knowledge,’ 7.
64 For Derrida’s recall of the double Latin filiation
of gathering (relegere) and binding (religare) in
‘religion’, see ‘Faith and Knowledge,’ 54.
65 See Derrida, ‘Before the Law,’ 210 (also 215),
and Cinders, 37 (also 15, 39).
66 I have developed the implications of this
Mallarme´an line in relation to Khoˆra but also
Cinders (Feu la cendre) in ‘Thinking (Through) the
Desert’, especially 75.
67 Of Grammatology, 140; first quoted in Ha¨gglund,
Radical Atheism, 75, then developed on pp. 88–89,
97, 99, 102, 105, 222 n. 25.
68 In an earlier study of deconstruction’s trajec-
tory from phenomenology to ethics, Christina
Howells had already signalled that ‘Critchley
makes a strong case, perhaps too strong a case, for
the Levinasian quality of Derrida’s ethics.’
(Derrida, 124).
69 A full, non-chronological listing of these critical
debates and their respective publications –
erroneously giving ‘The Impossibility of Ethics’
instead of ‘Radical Atheism and Unconditional
Responsibility’ as the chapter republication, in
Reading and Responsibility: Deconstruction Traces, of
Attridge’s review of Radical Atheism – can be found
on Martin Ha¨gglund’s site at http://www.
martinhagglund.se/. See in particular Laclau, ‘Is
Radical Atheism a Good Name for Deconstruc-
tion?’ and Ha¨gglund, ‘Time, Desire, Politics’
(2008); the special issue of The New Centennial
Review, with Ha¨gglund’s response, ‘The Challenge
of Radical Atheism’ (Spring 2009); Attridge’s
Review of Radical Atheism and Ha¨gglund, ‘The
Non-Ethical Opening of Ethics’ (2009–2010);
Caputo, ‘The Return of Anti-Religion’ and
Ha¨gglund, ‘The Radical Evil of Deconstruction’
(2011).
70 Ha¨gglund, Radical Atheism, ix.
71 Laclau, ‘Is Radical Atheism a Good Name for
Deconstruction?,’ 181; Attridge, ‘Radical Atheism
and Unconditional Responsibility,’14o, 144, quot-
ing from Radical Atheism, 103.
72 Ha¨gglund, ‘The Non-Ethical Opening of
Ethics,’ 299, and also 300, which describes the
relation between conditionality and uncondition-
ality as autoimmune.
73 Ha¨gglund, ‘The Non-Ethical Opening of
Ethics,’ 301, and 304–5, n. 5.
74 Derrida, Rogues, 172–73, n. 12; see also 150
about ‘the autoimmune aporia of this impossible
transaction between the conditional and the
unconditional, calculation and the incalculable.’
75 Derrida, ‘Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic
Suicides,’ 130.
76 Ha¨gglund, ‘The Non-Ethical Opening of
Ethics,’ 302 (almost repeated verbatim in ‘The
Radical Evil of Deconstruction,’143). See also his
conclusion on how to reinvent ethics in the name of
deconstruction, 303.
77 Ha¨gglund, ‘The Radical Evil of Deconstruc-
tion,’ e.g. 130, n. 13, and 131.
78 Ha¨gglund, ‘The Challenge of Radical Athe-
ism,’ 237.
79 The necessity of inscription, which follows from
the structure of succession, is also discussed in
relation to the trace-as-erasure of the now by
Ha¨gglund in ‘The Challenge of Radical Atheism,’
239, soon after stating that Derrida used writing ‘to
explain the transcendental nature of spacing’.
80 Derrida, The Post Card, 489 (‘Le facteur de la
ve´rite´’); bold emphasis mine.
81 Derrida, ‘Faith and Knowledge,’ 25.
82 See Rogues, 39, for Derrida’s denying the advent
of a political or ethical turn in deconstruction in
the 1980s or 1990s.
83 I have engaged more specifically with the
relation between pre-ethical violence and ethical
nonviolence, the notion of ‘force’, and the
performativity of deconstructive syntax in a
companion study titled ‘Breaching Ethics: Per-
forming Deconstruction’, first given as a plenary
lecture at the International Conference on ‘Ethos
Pathos Logos’ (University of Ploies¸ti, October
2012) and, in a revised iteration (in French), as a
keynote for the Fifth International Colloquium
Writing: Language and Thought on ‘Each time, the
impossible (Derrida (ten years later)’ (University
of Brasilia, 29 September-3 October 2014). The
present article can therefore be regarded as the first
half of a critical diptych on my understanding of
‘ethics’ in deconstruction.
84 Derrida, Specters of Marx, 99; hyphens and
italics mine.
85 Derrida, ‘Foi et savoir,’ 27; cf. the reductive,
monosemic translation in ‘Faith and Knowledge,’
17.
86 Levinas, Proper Names, 56.
Milesi
66
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
TPAR 988908—5/1/2015—SATHISHKUMAR.K—500448—Own Style
Bibliography
Attridge, Derek. “Reading and Responsibility: Deconstruction’s Traces.” Chap. 10 in Reading
and Responsibility: Deconstruction’s Traces. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
Originally published in Derrida Today 2, no. 2 (2009): 271–81 2010.
Benjamin, Andrew. Architectural Philosophy. London: Athlone, 2000.
Bennington, Geoffrey. “A Moment of Madness: Derrida’s Kierkegaard.” The Oxford Literary
Review 33, no. 1 (2011): 103–127.
Bernasconi, Robert. “Deconstruction and the Possibility of Ethics.” In Deconstruction and
Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida, edited by John Sallis, 122–139. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1987.
Bernasconi, Robert. “The Trace of Levinas in Derrida.” In Derrida and ‘Diffe´rance, edited by
David Wood and Robert Bernasconi, 13–29. Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1988.
Blanchot, Maurice. Friendship. Translated by Elizabeth Rottenberg. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1997.
Blanchot, Maurice. The Infinite Conversation. Translated and foreword by Susan Hanson.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
Blanchot, Maurice. “Thanks (Be Given) to Jacques Derrida.” Translated by Leslie Hill
In The Blanchot Reader, edited by Michael Holland, 317–323. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
Brunette, Peter, and David Wills. “The Spatial Arts: An Interview with Jacques Derrida.”
Translated byLaurieVolpe InDeconstruction and the Visual Arts: Art,Media, Architecture, edited
by Peter Brunette and David Wills, 9–32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Caputo, John D.The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion. Bloomington
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997.
Caputo, John D. “The Return of Anti-Religion: From Radical Atheism to Radical
Theology.” Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 11, no. 2 (2011): 32–124.
Cixous, He´le`ne. “What is it o’clock? or The door (we never enter).” Translated by Catherine
A.F. MacGillivray Stigmata: Escaping Texts, with a foreword by Jacques Derrida and a
new preface by the author, 57–83. London: Routledge, 2005 [1998].
Critchley, Simon. Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity: Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary French Thought.
London: Verso, 2009.
Critchley, Simon. The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas. 2nd edn. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1999.
Derrida, Jacques. “Abraham, the Other.” In Judeities: Questions for Jacques Derrida. trans.
Bettina Bergo and Michael B. Smith, edited by Bettina Bergo, Joseph Cohen, and
Raphael Zagury-Orly, 1–35. New York: Fordham UP, 2007.
Derrida, Jacques. Acts of Religion. Edited and with an introduction by Gil Anidjar. New York:
Routledge, 2002.
Derrida, Jacques. Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression. Translated by Eric Prenowitz. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1996.
Derrida, Jacques. “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides. A Dialogue with Jacques
Derrida.” Translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas In Philosophy in a Time of
Terror: Dialogues with Ju¨rgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, edited by Giovanna Borradori,
83–136. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
Derrida, Jacques. “Before the Law.” Translated by Avital Ronell In Acts of Literature, edited
by Derek Attridge, 183–219. New York: Routledge, 1992.
Derrida, Jacques. Demeure: Fiction and Testimony. Translated by Elizabeth Rottenberg.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.
Derrida, Jacques. “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of “Religion” at the Limits of
Reason Alone.” Translated by Samuel Weber In Religion, edited by Jacques Derrida and
Gianni Vattimo, 1–78. Cambridge: Polity, 1998.
Derrida, Jacques. “Fifty-two Aphorisms for a Foreword.” Translated by Andrew Benjamin
In Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume II, edited by Peggy Kamuf and
Elizabeth Rottenberg, 117–126. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.
Derrida, Jacques. “Foi et savoir. Les deux sources de la “religion” aux limites de la simple
raison.” La religion. Se´minaire de Capri sous la direction de Jacques Derrida et Gianni
Vattimo, 9–86. Paris: Seuil, 1996.
parallax
67
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
TPAR 988908—5/1/2015—SATHISHKUMAR.K—500448—Own Style
Derrida, Jacques. “Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority.”.” Translated by
Mary Quaintance Acts of Religion. edited and with an introduction by Gil Anidjar,
230–298. New York: Routledge, 2002.
Derrida, Jacques. “Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok.”
Translated by Barbara Johnson Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, The Wolf Man’s
Magic Word: A Cryptonymy. Translated by Nicholas Rand, Foreword by Jacques Derrida,
xi–xiviii. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.
Derrida, Jacques. Geneses, Genealogies, Genres, and Geniuses: The Secrets of the Archive. Translated
by Beverley Bie Brahic. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
Derrida, Jacques. H. C. for Life, That Is to Say . . . . Translated, with additional notes, by
Laurent Milesi and Stefan Herbrechter. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006.
Derrida, Jacques. “Heidegger’s Hand (Geschlecht II).” Translated by John P. Leavey Jr. and
Elizabeth Rottenberg In Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume II, edited by Peggy Kamuf
and Elizabeth Rottenberg, 27–62. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.
Derrida, Jacques. “Hostipitality.” Translated by Barry Stocker and Forbes Morlock Angelaki
5, no. 3 (2000): 3–19.
Derrida, Jacques. “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials.” Translated by Ken Frieden and
Elizabeth Rottenberg In Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume II, edited by Peggy Kamuf
and Elizabeth Rottenberg, 143–195. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.
Derrida, Jacques. Khoˆra. Paris: Galile´e, 1993.
Derrida, Jacques. “Khora.” Translated by Ian McLeod In On the Name, edited by
Thomas Dutoit, 89–127. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.
Derrida, Jacques. Le toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy. Paris: Galile´e, 2000.
Derrida, Jacques. Margins of Philosophy. Translated, with Additional Notes, by Alan Bass.
Brighton: Harvester, 1982.
Derrida, Jacques. “Marx & Sons.” Translated by G.M. Goshgarian Ghostly Demarcations:
A Symposium on Jacques Derrida’s ‘Specters of Marx’’. edited and introduced by Michael
Sprinker, 213–269. London: Verso, 1999.
Derrida, Jacques.Monolingualism of the Other; or, The Prosthesis of Origins. Translated by Patrick
Mensah. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.
Derrida, Jacques. Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971–2001. Edited, Translated, and
with an Introduction by Elizabeth Rottenberg. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2001.
Derrida, Jacques. “No (Point of) Madness – Maintaining Architecture.” Translated by Kate
Linker In Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume II, edited by Peggy Kamuf and
Elizabeth Rottenberg, 87–103. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.
Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Corrected edition. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997.
Derrida, Jacques. Of Hospitality / Anne Dufourmantelle Invites Jacques Derrida to Respond.
Translated by Rachel Bowlby. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.
Derrida, Jacques. On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy. Translated by Christine Irizarry. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2005.
Derrida, Jacques. Points . . . Interviews, 1974–1994. Translated by Peggy Kamuf et al., edited by
Elisabeth Weber. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.
Derrida, Jacques. Psyche. Inventions de l’autre. Paris: Galile´e, 1987.
Derrida, Jacques. Rogues: Two Essays on Reason. Translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and
Michael Naas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.
Derrida, Jacques. Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New
International. Translated by Peggy Kamuf. Introduction by Bernd Magnus and Stephen
Cullenberg. New York: Routledge, 1994.
Derrida, Jacques. Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs. Translated,
with an Introduction, by David B. Allison. Preface by Newton Garver. Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1973.
Derrida, Jacques. The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume I. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.
Derrida, Jacques. The Gift of Death. Translated by David Wills. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1995.
Milesi
68
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
TPAR 988908—5/1/2015—SATHISHKUMAR.K—500448—Own Style
Derrida, Jacques.The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond. Translated, introduction and
additional notes by Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
Derrida, Jacques. ““This Strange Institution Called Literature:” An Interview with Jacques
Derrida.” Translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby In Acts of Literature,
edited by Derek Attridge, 33–75. New York: Routledge, 1992.
Derrida, Jacques, and Maurizio Ferraris. A Taste for the Secret. Translated by Giacomo Donis,
edited by Giacomo Donis and David Webb. Cambridge: Polity, 2001.
Ha¨gglund, Martin. Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2008.
Ha¨gglund, Martin. “The Challenge of Radical Atheism: A Response.” The New Centennial
Review 9, no. 1 (2009): 227–252.
Ha¨gglund, Martin. “The Non-Ethical Opening of Ethics: A Response to Derek Attridge.”
Derrida Today 3, no. 2 (2010): 295–305.
Ha¨gglund, Martin. “The Radical Evil of Deconstruction: A Reply to John Caputo.” Journal
for Cultural and Religious Theory 11, no. 2 (2011): 126–150.
Ha¨gglund, Martin. “Time, Desire, Politics: A Reply to Ernesto Laclau.”Diacritics 38, no. 1–2
(2008): 190–199.
Howells, Christina. Derrida: Deconstruction from Phenomenology to Ethics. Cambridge: Polity,
1999.
Khatib, Sami. “Derrida & Sons: Marx, Benjamin, and the Specter of the Messianic.” http://
anthropologicalmaterialism.hypotheses.org/1810
Laclau, Ernesto. “Is Radical Atheism a Good Name for Deconstruction?”Diacritics 38, no. 1–
2 (2008): 180–189.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Proper Names. Translated by Michael B. Smith. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1996.
Levine, Michael G. A Weak Messianic Power: Figures of a Time to Come in Benjamin, Derrida, and
Celan. New York: Fordham University Press, 2014.
Milesi, Laurent. “Portrait of H.C. as J.D. and Back.” New Literary History 37, no. 1 (2006):
65–84.
Milesi, Laurent. “Semiology and Deconstruction: From Sign to Trace.” In Managing Global
Communications. Proceedings of the 2nd ROASS Conference, edited by Doina Cmeciu and
Traian D. Sta˘nciulescu, 135–146. Baca˘u: Alma Mater, 2009.
Milesi, Laurent. “Thinking (Through) the Desert (la pense´e du de´sert) with(in) Jacques
Derrida.” In The Politics of Deconstruction: Jacques Derrida and the Other of Philosophy, edited
by Martin McQuillan, 173–191. London: Pluto, 2007.
Miller, J. Hillis. “Derrida’s Topographies.” Chap. 11 in Topographies. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1995.
Miller, J. Hillis. For Derrida. New York: Fordham University Press, 2009.
Papadakis, Andreas, Catherine Cooke, and Andrew Benjamin, eds. Deconstruction Omnibus
Volume. London: Academy Editions, 1990.
Srajek, Martin C. In the Margins of Deconstruction. Jewish Conceptions of Ethics in Emmanuel Levinas
and Jacques Derrida. Dordrecht: Springer, 1998.
The New Centennial Review. 9, no. 1: ‘Living On: Of Martin Ha¨gglund.’ 2009.
Vitale, Francesco. “Jacques Derrida and the Politics of Architecture.” Serbian Architectural
Journal 2, no. 3 (2010): 215–226.
Vitale, Francesco. “The Law of the Oikos. Jacques Derrida and the Deconstruction of the
Dwelling.” Serbian Architectural Journal 5, no. 1 (2013): 59–74.
Ware, Owen. “Dialectic of the Past / Disjuncture of the Future: Derrida and Benjamin on the
Concept of Messianism.” Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 5, no. 2 (2004): 99–114.
Laurent Milesi is Chair of the Centre for Critical and Cultural Theory at Cardiff
University, where he also teaches 20th-Century English/American Literature, and is
a member of the ITEM-CNRS Research Group on James Joyce’s manuscripts in
Paris. He has written numerous essays on Joyce and related aspects of modernism,
19th- and 20th-century (American) poetry, postmodernism and poststructuralism,
parallax
69
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
TPAR 988908—5/1/2015—SATHISHKUMAR.K—500448—Own Style
with a particular emphasis on Jacques Derrida and He´le`ne Cixous. Aside from
several other translation projects related to Derrida’s and Cixous’s works, he is
completing a monograph on the sense of ‘(non-)place’ in Derrida. Email:
senlpm@cf.ac.uk
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